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Abstract
Following Lee & Demetis [20] who showed how
systems theorizing can be conducted on the basis of a
few systems principles, in this paper, we apply these
principles to theorize about the systemic character of
technology and investigate the role-reversal in the
relationship between humans and technology. By
applying systems-theoretical requirements outlined
by Lee & Demetis, we examine conditions for the
systemic character of technology and, based on our
theoretical discussion, we argue that humans can
now be considered artifacts shaped and used by the
(system of) technology rather than vice versa. We
argue that the role-reversal has considerable
implications for the field of information systems that
has thus far focused only on the use of the IT artifact
by humans. We illustrate these ideas with empirical
material from a well known case from the financial
markets: the collapse (“Flash Crash”) of the Dow
Jones Industrial Average.

1. Introduction
The field of Information Systems (IS) rests
largely on examining the contextual use of
technology within social (sub)-systems and
organizations. In such a context, the relationship
between the social and the technical has always been
of special interest to IS researchers. Ultimately, this
interest is applied to the interactions between humans
and information technology, and at the center of
attention, one can often find the concept of the IT
artifact. From considering the IT artifact as an
ensemble of hardware and software [27] to bundles
of material and cultural properties that are
recognizable
and
emerge
from
ongoing
socioeconomic practices [34], or even to
sociotechnical assemblages [38], one thing is clear:
the concept of the IT artifact has changed
substantially over the years. In fact, the ontological
dimensions upon which the “IT artifact” has come to
be considered have shifted so much that Steven
Alter’s suggestion was to “retire” that concept
altogether from the lexicon of IS scholarly debate as
it has outlived its usefulness [1]. While this is not an
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essay about the concept of the IT artifact per se, we
do make the argument that the nebulous character of
that concept is due to a much larger (though subtle)
phenomenon at play: the transition of technology
from artifact to system. In fact, the contextual
richness that has been added to the concept of the “IT
artifact” after its first use by March and Smith [27],
can be re-interpreted as a recognition of such a
transition. Inspired by the post-humanist tradition that
reflects on the boundaries between humans and
technology, we take a different approach and develop
a systems theoretical description of the transition
from artifact to system. We argue that people are
becoming agents of the (system of) technology.
Over time, technology has penetrated society to
such a degree that even basic functions now seem
almost inconceivable without technology. Indeed, the
level of dependence of society on technology has
become so deep that – in a large number of fields –
there are now no manual fallback plans in cases of
technological failure. By and large, even when
technology fails, we tend to rely on more technology
for rectifying the problems of technological use.
Also, the rising trend of technologized decision
making that has taken certain fields by storm is even
more alarming. In the foreign exchange markets for
example, 85 percent of all trading is conducted by
algorithms alone, i.e., without any human
intervention; this led the scholars that investigated the
phenomenon to call this the “Rise of the Machines”
[10]. In the UK, the “ultra-high-speed version of
algorithmic trading, high frequency trading, is
estimated to account for over 77% of transactions in
the UK market” [40, p.5].
A skeptic of our position who might seek to argue
against the trend of technologized decision making,
might pose this question: Is it not the case that the
designers of algorithms are humans? And if so, then
couldn’t someone consider the role of algorithms
(and of technology at large) as an extended
application of human decisions?
Our challenge is to convince the reader to the
contrary. For this purpose, we render this issue
through a few intertwined questions: How does
technology subvert and subdue human decisions?
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What characteristics can be identified (with the help
of systems theorizing) for this new role that
technology has assumed and how does this constitute
the emergence of a system of technology? Even more
crucially, how is it that humans become “artifacts”
being shaped and used by technology in this –
seemingly counterintuitive – role reversal?
As we will see through our example of the Flash
Crash regarding the Dow Jones Industrial Average,
the role of technology leads us to consider a
seemingly radical idea at first – but one that we
believe is an accurate reflection of how technology
shapes social systems and subjects humans to forces
that cast them out to the environment, outside of what
has become technologized decision making; instead
of the IT artifact being shaped and used by humans,
humans can actually be considered as “artifacts”
being shaped and used by machines. In this view, it is
humans that must react to technological stimuli rather
than technology that must react to human stimuli
where, furthermore, the technological stimuli are
emergent and not pre-designed (or pre-programmed)
in any way. This also assumes that while the
controllability of technology can be achieved at a
micro-scale (where one could assert that the link
between designers and – control of – artifacts is
strict), at a macro-scale, technology exhibits
emergent non-linear phenomena that render human
controllability irrelevant [4, 14]. This creates a
significant circularity wherein the systemic role of
technology demands a higher degree of autonomy to
be granted in the design of technological artifacts,
where this then leads to a deeper systemic function of
technology that leads to more demands for autonomy.
Humans increasingly find themselves in the
environment, outside of these dynamics.

2. Examples
Indeed, one can find a wealth of examples where
technological autonomy has developed into a system
that takes over important decisions – and humans
find themselves outside, i.e., cast out to the
environment, outside of these decisions. In such
examples, human agency – “acting on behalf of
another, or providing a particular service” [16] is
being replaced by technologized agency. In
categorizing the World Wide Web for instance,
Yahoo (to bring up one example) uses proprietary
algorithmic robots (known as bots) to create a
searchable database that then ranks users’ search
results based on their search queries. The structuring
of the bot-generated entries contains the logic of how
something will be “made searchable,” though due to
the complexity of the task, the interaction between

bots and websites that are indexed must be
unsupervised. But while the millions of pre-indexed
search results give the illusion of choice, almost 90%
of humans don’t get past the top ten [18]. The whole
process feels like a “search on the Internet” but it is
actually a restricted human search of a technological
pre-search of the Internet: the “search of a search”
that constitutes a 2nd order phenomenon. Hence, this
is a case of a human reacting to technological stimuli
(i.e., an individual person reacting to the
algorithmically generated search results intended to
steer the person’s behavior) rather than a technology
reacting to human stimuli (i.e, a neutral search
algorithm providing objective results to best serve a
human using the technology).
Another well-known example comes from
Amazon. The vast majority of prices are defined by
algorithms in so far as Amazon vendors “use
algorithmic pricing to ensure that they can
automatically change their product prices based on a
competitor” [39], with the result that vendors are
being forced to engage in this practice for fear of
losing out to the competition. Meanwhile, the
algorithmic interactions between vendors carry the
possibility
of
developing
unpredictable
consequences. Such algorithmic pricing on Amazon
can be found in the example of the book entitled The
Making of a Fly by evolutionary biologist Peter
Lawrence. This book came to be priced at
$23,698,655.93 (plus $3.99 shipping) as two sellers
were using algorithms to adjust the price of the book
in response to one another. It took 10 days for
humans to notice and intervene to bring back the
prices to normal levels [43]; ironically, “normal
levels” merely indicated a temporary human decision
that would allow the continuation of algorithmic
pricing.
Similar examples where human decisions and
human reactions find themselves outside the
boundary of technologized decision making can
come from any domain. In law for instance, legal
analysts are being replaced in complex cases by
software that analyses thousands of legal documents;
proprietary e-discovery algorithms of software
companies pre-structure the defense/prosecution of a
case by effectively pre-selecting an extremely limited
subset of documents that will then be looked at and
presented in court by humans [28]. By and large, it
would be fair to say that in such cases, humans
become the tool through which computerized
decisions are voiced. In autonomous driving,
Google’s self-driving car assumes full control of the
vehicle, and while in principle, it might appear as if
human decisions can always override the
technologized driving process, there are no strict
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criteria which humans could apply in such a process
(as the decisions of the vehicle cannot but depend on
the unpredictable circumstances that emerge in its
environment); the self-driving car caused its first
crash when the human user was not certain whether
he should have intervened [13]. In news, Bloomberg
now uses automated sentiment analysis to provide
financial news about companies in an automated
way; this can further assist its customers in making
financial decisions, “without having to consume the
content” [7]. In the job market, many of the world’s
biggest companies use automated vetting software to
screen CVs for particular job applications without
even glancing at the CVs on the first round [30].
Even in the judiciary, the discussion on whether
computers would be better and fairer judges has
started since 1977 and has considered the algorithmic
imposition of verdicts and fines [12].
The next and third section of this essay provides a
review of a selection of the general requirements
proposed by Lee & Demetis [20] for systems
theorizing, for the purpose of theorizing about
technology itself as a system in the systems
theoretical sense. This section also serves to pose
reflective questions about the deep interference of
technology in society and highlight elements that
ought to be considered for technology in this context.
The fourth section will present the case of the
Flash Crash in the Dow Jones Industrial Average
Index and will review the key characteristics of that
case by considering how technology shaped the minicrisis through automated execution strategies.
In the fifth – and final – section of the essay, we
shall conclude with a brief discussion and reflect on
the consequences of the basic systemic principles of
technology.

3. Theoretical conditions for technology
itself as a system
In exploring a set of requirements/principles that
systems theorizing needs to satisfy, Lee & Demetis
[20] consider general principles that are based on the
founders of systems theory like Ludwig von
Bertalanffy [5], Kenneth Boulding [8], James Grier
Miller [31] and Anatol Rapoport [36]. In their work,
Lee & Demetis [20] extract three principles from this
body of systems theory and add another three from
Niklas Luhmann [25]; they maintain that systems
theory is particularly relevant for IS research and a
rich theory to draw from (regardless of any
epistemological differences amongst different
scholars). In this context, we argue that systems
theory lends itself in exposing the subtle emergence

of technologized interferences in the relationship
between humans and technology and will enable
researchers (due to its abstract/generalized lexicon) to
render novel cases through its concepts across several
domains of application. In Table 1 below, we list the
six requirements as they appear in Lee & Demetis
[20]. We give each one a code (Ri) for when we use
the requirements in this paper though it is worth
stressing that we don’t reflect on all six equally. Also,
for the purposes of our discussion, we do not
examine them in sequential order.
Requirement specified in Lee & Demetis [19]

Code

The whole is more than the sum of the parts
Goal Seeking

R1
R2

Transformation Process (of inputs into
outputs)
Self-Reference & Autopoiesis
System/Environment distinction

R3
R4
R5

Communication
R6
Table 1: Systems Requirements by Lee & Demetis [20]

Our presentation of their requirements below is
not a substitute for the original theoretical analysis –
rather, it will be a discussion focused on targeting
those theoretical conditions for thinking about a
system comprised of technology. In other words,
through different systems-theoretical principles, we
can focus on the following question: what systems
theoretical principles would need to be adhered to, in
order to consider technology itself as a system?
One of the first requirements that Lee & Demetis
[20] stipulate in R1 is the requirement to recognize
that if we consider any system as a whole then “the
whole is more than the sum of the parts.” Regardless
of whether we take technological artifacts in one
sense (e.g. a combination of hardware/software) or
another (e.g. sociotechnical assemblages), this
requirement still applies. Whenever any elements
become interrelated and interdependent, they form a
more complex system; however: “One cannot deduce
from complexity alone which relations among
elements are realized” [25, p.25]. Applied to
technology at large, this systemic requirement
demands that whatever technological “whole” is
identified by an observer needs to be considered as a
system that exhibits emergent properties. These
properties remain irreducible to the whole’s
constituent elements.
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Another important requirement (R5) is based upon
the fundamental distinction between system and
environment. As stressed by Lee & Demetis [20], this
requirement is absolutely critical as no system can be
perceived without an environment [3]. The
environment should not be perceived as some type of
residual category. Instead, “relationship to the
environment is constitutive in system formation” [25,
p.176]. By considering this fundamental principle
that constitutes a pillar of systems theory and
transcends all systems theorists [17], we can pose an
important question: if we consider technology as a
system then what is its environment? One response
would be that humans (also labeled by Niklas
Luhmann as psychic systems) are in the environment
outside of and around a system of technology; another
would be other technologies that would not
interconnect directly with a specified (by an
observer) system of technology. Another option of
course would be a combination of the above – an
environment wherein both humans/technology reside.
While all possibilities can be considered, when we
describe technology as a system in itself, we make the
case that – via the systemic evolution of technology
and its deep penetration in society – technology as
system assimilates more functions within itself; in
doing so, humans are cast out to the environment
around the system of technology and cease to
perform the function of decision making. The
function of humans in the environment outside a
system of technology becomes ever more restricted in
merely providing inputs through which technological
decision-making can continue uninterrupted. This is
of course both hard to accept (for humans) and
difficult to explore. It also implies that humans
simply react to what is now technologized decision
making and that, by and large, human “decisions” are
secondary to systems-made decisions. At the very
least, humans and what they believe their own
decision-making to be need to adapt to the emergence
of systemic technological phenomena. Is human
behavior patterning itself after, or simply being
patterned by, what the system of technology
generates?
One implication leading from the primacy of the
system/environment distinction is that the distinction
can be replicated within the system (so within any
observed system, one can delineate further subsystem/environment distinctions). This is another way
of saying that the system replicates that primary
distinction (between system/environment) within
itself. This idea of any form (defined by Luhmann as
the unity of a distinction) affecting itself recursively
is distilled in the concept of re-entry. Based on
George Spencer-Brown [41], Luhmann makes the

following remarks: “Accordingly, the re-entry of the
form into the form—or of the distinction into the
distinction, or of the difference between system and
environment into the system—should be understood
as referring to the same thing twice. The distinction
re-enters the distinguished. This constitutes re-entry.”
[26, p.54]
This type of re-entry is tightly connected with the
concept of self-reference (R4): satisfying the systemic
requirement for self-reference means identifying
processes through which a system collects
information about itself (and its own functioning),
where this in turn can contribute to a change in its
functioning. Through self-referential processes,
certain systems (those that Luhmann calls
autopoietic) continuously re-produce and maintain
themselves. In this regard, considering technology as
a self-referential system implies recognition of these
dynamics that exhibit this form of re-entry;
technology referring to technology is not a new
phenomenon but again, in the context of
technologized decision-making this acquires further
significance. To the degree that technologized
decisions become deeply embedded across different
social systems, they elevate the complexity of the
system of technology. This condition makes it harder
for humans to gain visibility of the consequences of
such systemic technologizing and, due to the
excessive reliance of humans on technology, this
reinforces the role-reversal between the two. The
demand for further technologizing ends up with
humans augmenting the systemic character of
technology further.
Another important systems requirement that
follows Luhmann’s systems theory involves the
requirement for communication (R6). For Luhmann,
who reserves the term communication to indicate a
broader mechanism (instead of only an act between
human individuals), communication can be
considered in the following triad form:
announcement/utterance (Mitteilung), information
(Information), and understanding (Verstehen). Also,
in the event where human beings are participating in
the communication process, it would follow that the
cognitive understanding (Verstehen) that would be
developed by the recipient might not correspond to
the intentionality of the individual conducting the
utterance.
The reciprocity in communication however
demands that whatever entity is receiving
information following another entity’s utterance will
react based on its own (the former’s) understanding.
While we are typically used to be thinking about
these processes as human-based exchanges, they can
be easily applied at a more abstract level. In fact, one
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of the pioneering theoretical implications of
Luhmann’s systems theory was the separation of the
communication process from psychic systems (i.e.
humans) and its consideration as a function of society
[23, 25]. In a system comprised of technology (rather
than of humans), the hardest element of the triad to
consider is understanding; however, that does not
have
to
be
cognitive
understanding
for
communication to be facilitated. In the case of a
system of technology, substituting for human (or
cognitive)
understanding
is
technologized
understanding; this signals the a priori acceptance or
rejection of any information, which would then
prompt a computational response (another utterance)
on the basis of a pre-coded algorithmic rationality.
This demarcates the transition from (human)
reflective
understanding
to
pre-organized
understanding (that effectively collapses – or is
reduced to – computerized decision making). Of
course, substituting the second for the first is
troubling. Also, human decisions are not just
transferred across to computer decisions via the
design of specific artifacts. The input from human
designers is transformed (R3) into systemtechnologized decisions/outputs through a complex
nexus of technological interactions. While the goalseeking (R2) of specific algorithms may be perceived
as fixed at the micro-level, at the macro-level of the
system it becomes dynamic and uncertain. The very
existence of unpredictable phenomena that emerge
from such technological interactions is a testament to
the fact that the correspondence between inputs and
outputs in this context is non-linear. As technology
becomes responsible for “major systemic changes
within the global financial sector…and as algorithms
become ever more autonomous… we need a kind of
ethical framework for developing algorithms” [44].

4. CASE OF THE DOW JONES INDEX
First, let us clarify that it is beyond the scope of this
paper to organize and/or deconstruct all the
technologically-oriented incidents behind the events
of May 6, 2010 (what has become known as the
“Flash Crash of 2:45”). Indeed, there remain several
conflicting aspects on these events [22, 32, 40, 44,
46] so we will focus here only on a handful of critical
aspects that illustrate how the demand for increasing
computerization is framing the interactions between
humans and machines. In this regard, we would also
like to highlight that the complexity of this case has
also been attributed to the multi-faceted role of
algorithmic traders who make it almost impossible to

deconstruct the case; this is acknowledged in several
reports (see below).
The purpose of this section is to reflect on the
case of the Flash Crash and connect some of its key
aspects to a systems-based re-conceptualization of
technology based on the systemic principles put
forward by Lee & Demetis [20]. This theoretical
framing will allow us to consider the case of the Dow
Jones index collapse as an example of technological
domination—an example where the system of
technology locates human artifacts in its
environment, outside of and around the technology.
The key sources that we will use in order to review
the main findings of the Flash Crash include:
i) The Report of the Staffs of the U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) and Securities & Exchange
Commission (SEC) to the Joint Advisory
Committee on Emerging Regulatory Issues.
ii) The UK report on “Crashes and high
frequency trading” from the Government
Office for Science (The Future of Computer
Trading in Financial Markets – Foresight
Driver Review – DR 7), and
iii) An analysis for Certified Public Accountants
when
advising
investors
entitled
“Understanding the ‘Flash Crash’ ” that
summarizes the basic characteristics of the
Flash Crash in a succinct way [6].
First, in order to set the scene, it is important that
we reflect on the turmoil behind the specific events in
their broader context. Uncertainty in May 2010 was
already widespread in the market due to the
possibility of a Greek government default on
sovereign debt [29]. Based on R5, we can think of this
broader financial turmoil as the environmental
stimulus to which the system of algorithmic traders
would react. This negative market sentiment “was
already affecting an increase in the price volatility of
some individual securities” [9, p.1]. This set in
motion the following key events before the 2:45pm
Crash (in chronological order):
1) A number of volatility pauses were triggered
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
around 1pm; individual equities began to
increase above average levels.
2) The S&P 500 volatility index rose by 22.5%
by 2:30pm. In conditions of such volatility,
investors moved their capital away from
investments that were considered to be highrisk and towards safer options while the
Dow Jones Industrial Average was down by
2.5% (due to selling pressure).
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3) Buy-side liquidity in the “E-Mini” and the
“SPY” (the E-mini S&P 500 futures
contracts and the S&P 500 SPDR exchange
traded fund) had suffered 55% and 20%
declines respectively.
4) Then, more critically, at about 2:32pm, a
large fundamental trader (a mutual fund
complex) “initiated a sell program to sell a
total of 75,000 E-mini contracts (valued at
approximately $4.1billion) as a hedge to an
existing equity position” [9, p.2].
The last step in the event is viewed as one of the
critical triggers that led to the Flash Crash. But before
we develop that further, we need to make an
important observation in this context. Whereas
traders can choose how much human judgment is
involved when executing a trade (e.g. the trader can
choose to enter orders manually in different time
intervals, or indeed, outsource the process to a thirdparty that will manage this process by conducting
block-trades), over the years, the interference of
human judgment came to be perceived (by humans
themselves) as an obstacle. For example, Lewis [21]
remarks that during the crash of 1987 when the US
stock market fell sharply by 22.61%, “some Wall
Street brokers, to avoid the orders their customers
wanted to place to sell stocks, simply declined to pick
up their phones … this time the authorities responded
by changing the rules – making it easier for
computers to do the jobs done by those imperfect
people. The 1987 stock market crash set in motion a
process – weak at first, stronger over the years – that
has ended with computers entirely replacing the
people” [21, p.3]. The need for computerization was
paired with the inexorable need for speed; the
intensification of these dynamics led to Wall Street’s
“speed war.” An example of that saw the
development of a superfast fiber-cable route between
Chicago and New York by Daniel Spivey, just to
shave “3 milliseconds off of the previous route of
lowest latency” [42]. Speed matters; the fastest
algorithm can exploit a large volume of minor
discrepancies between markets and this is like
“picking gold coins from the floor” [42].
In such a context where 825 miles of fiber are laid
down through mountains, tunnels, and rivers, in the
straightest line possible in order to shave off 3
milliseconds of trading, one can begin to contemplate
how human beings are perceived (by the designers of
algorithmic trading systems) where the average
reaction time (for the click of a button) is 215
milliseconds. Human beings are not just slow – they
are (almost) redundant in such a market (though – as
we shall see – they still serve the purpose of

recalibrating (parts of) the technological system that
is actually making the decisions). More recently, the
search for more speed that would allow even faster
versions of algorithmic trading to take place has led
to large investments in microwave communications –
with the goal of shaving off an extra 1 millisecond in
transacting [45].
It was in this context that the large fundamental
trader initiated a sell program for the $4.1bn trade;
this was executed automatically and thus an
algorithm took the task to sell $4.1bn. In this case,
the trader “chose to execute this sell program via a …
‘Sell Algorithm’ that was programmed to feed orders
… but without regard to price or time” [9, pp.2-3].
The algorithm only took volume into consideration.
But while the initial problems were indeed created by
the algorithm of the fundamental trader, they were
then “amplified by the strategic behavior of the HFT
[High-Frequency Trading]” [40, p.11]. HFT is yet
another name for algorithmic trading or black-box
trading. The consequences of the amplification of the
Sell Algorithm by yet other algorithms created a
dynamic exchange between technologies of the same
type. Based on R3 this can be framed in the following
general form: Technology A provides a stimulus for
exciting technology B, and the output of B’s
operation(s), as feedback and input to A, recursively
shape the environment of technological subsystem A.
One can conceptualize this situation through
systems theorizing by means of considering
alternative observing perspectives with which to
explore the system/environment distinction (R5).
First, if the Sell Algorithm executed by the large
fundamental trader is considered from the perspective
of technological subsystem A, then in its environment
one can observe: a) the totality of all other automated
execution algorithms (let’s call those Algo(1),
Algo(2), ….Algo(n)), and b) the transaction outcomes
from human traders (though as we saw in the
introduction, the volume of their transactions is
becoming more and more limited). Similarly, if we
take the different observing perspective of another
HFT, say Algo(2), which we define as our system, we
would observe the Sell Algorithm in its environment,
along with all other automated execution algorithms
[Algo(1), Algo(3), …Algo(n)] and the human traders.
Naturally, for fair competition reasons, the trading
logic of any given Algo(n) is hidden from all other
algorithms. Considering both of the mentioned
observing perspectives in tandem at a meta-level (one
that would be applicable for any automated
execution), we have a system that is stimulated by the
reactions it itself triggers upon its own environment.
Indeed, while the sell pressure established by the
“Sell Algorithm” was initially absorbed by High-
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Frequency Traders (HFT’s), - at about 2:44pm –
HFT’s started to sell contracts aggressively. Then,
the “Sell Algorithm” used by the large trader
responded to the increased volume by increasing the
rate at which it was feeding the orders into the
market, even though orders that it already sent to the
market were arguably not yet fully absorbed” [9,
p.3]. This type of self-reference (R4) can be portrayed
as a “negative spiraling effect … (where)… HFT
may have a destabilizing effect through its
endogenous self-excitation nature within the (small)
pool of participants” [40, p.11]. This unsupervised
self-excitation of technology at the level of the
financial market is based upon a coupling between
technology and technology, a condition that relegates
humans to the external environment of that system.
This has both significant and specific implications.
In the events that unfolded, the Dow Jones
Industrial Average plunged 998.5 points. This
became known as the Flash Crash of 2:45 (and while
the index recovered some moments later, it wiped out
value from several companies). After five months of
investigations, the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), along with the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), attributed the
decline to the automated execution of orders despite
the fact that no specific reason/trigger/algorithm
could be identified for the event. In fact, “the exact
reason or reasons for the so-called flash crash remain
obscured by the mechanics of the electronic trading
systems that execute millions of buy-and-sell orders
during the course of a single trading day. Some
initially blamed the crash on a ‘fat finger,’ (meaning
a big individual investor) while others contended that
essentially unregulated electronic trading platforms
were the culprit. Others even questioned whether
terrorists or hackers were behind the dramatic drop”
[6, pp.40-41].
The difficulty in identifying a specific cause
renders the very idea of cause-and-effect (itself a
nonsystematic idea) problematic in this context; this
constitutes an irony, considering that the repeatable
operations of technology usually allow the
identification/back-tracking of effects. Of course,
without recursive feedback, technology as a system
would not exhibit such ramifications in the first
place. In this regard, what would otherwise be
conceptualized as cause and effect is better
conceptualized as a web of back-and-forth impacts
distributed amongst the complex interactions within
the broader system of technology. There is no “error”
in the individual technologies themselves (i.e. the
algorithms); no bug needs be rectified. Thus, nonattribution of error to a single algorithm leads us to
consider this as a systemic phenomenon that emerges

out of the complex interaction of multiple automated
execution technologies (R1).
Of course, the flash crash would have been
impossible at such a level without the complex
interactions between algorithms. As the testimony of
SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro confirmed to the US
Congress: “automated trading systems will follow
their coded logic regardless of outcome, while human
involvement likely would have prevented these
orders from executing at absurd prices” [37, p.7]. The
unpredictability with which automated algorithms
feed off each other creates emergent conditions that
can destabilize any system that technology itself
penetrates. For the financial system that serves such
an important function within the broader system of
society, the implications are clear: Market outcomes
are guided by computerized decisions that are
executed
algorithmically.
While
individual
algorithms may reflect the general intentions of their
designers, the algorithms as a whole find themselves
within a far more complex environment (that they
themselves help to constitute and create). In such
conditions, algorithms feed off each other and –
within the demands for millisecond transacting and
communication (R6) – create another version of the
financial system where transacting decisions are
executed in a technologized fashion; these lead to
unpredictable consequences. Ultimately, this rearranges the roles of technology and humans.
For example, while the chaotic behavior was
continuing in the flash crash, another algorithm was
triggered, known as the Stop Logic Functionality of
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). This was
automatically executed in order to prevent any further
price movements over an excessive range. By
effectively pausing the market momentarily, this
gives time to humans to recalibrate any parameters
and re-launch the algorithms in the pit of algorithmic
trading. The need to include Stop and Pause
algorithms in order to contain any emergent
uncertainties from the automated behavior of other
buy/sell algorithms illustrates two things: first, how
the “controllability” of technology is dependent on
more technology, and, b) how restricted the role of
human beings has become in the actual decisionmaking process in the financial system. To a large
degree, “People no longer are responsible for what
happens in the market, because computers make all
the decisions” [21, p.270]. Whatever intentionality is
imbued within specific algorithms by its designers,
this dissipates quickly. Humans are merely there to
“recalibrate” the re-launch of algorithms so that the
latter can be pitted against each other in millions of
millisecond-transactions, the net result of which is
unpredictable.
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Of course, once the demand for algorithmic
decisions is set firmly, further complications can be
considered. For example, new “crash algorithms will
likely be developed to trade during periods of market
stresses in order to profit from these periods” [40,
p.4]. Algorithms will also be developed that will
attempt to exploit to the maximum the number of
times they can offer/request something from the
market. The patterns of some of these algorithms
have been discovered on a few occasions, and what is
rather astonishing is the speed with which orders may
be placed. Below is a visualization of an algorithm
(labeled the “Knife” by the company Nanex) where
the algorithm transacts around 7 times every 60
milliseconds; in the image below, the dotted vertical
lines indicate the 60ms intervals while the whole
duration represented in the image below is 1.6
seconds. The analysis of the company on highfrequency trading found “cases where one exchange
was sending an extremely high number of quotes for
one stock in a single second: as high as 5,000 quotes
in 1 second!” That’s 5 quotes (for the same stock)
every millisecond. As the company states: “Even
more disturbing, there doesn’t seem to be any
economic justification for this” [33].

Figure 1: Visualization of algorithmic formations
during trading (with kind permission from nanex.net)
Also, one can consider here algorithms that are
designed to find the digital footprints of each other.
By considering such algorithms that collaborate in
specific market conditions, we could see the
emergence of unfair algorithmic competition; and
indeed, with the increasing attention that has been
given to information security and cybersecurity
breaches [15], automated financial trading may
become subject to hackers or terrorists that will seek
to create financial instability deliberately (e.g. by
deactivating/ modifying a stop algorithm). Whatever
the destabilization effect, the speed of such
transacting and the practical alienation of the human
factor, relegated to the environment of the system of
technology, can lead to an algorithmic war. To
summarize, this involves algorithms that structure the

market (by automated execution), anti-systemic
algorithms that could destabilize the system (e.g. by
creating complexity in automated transacting and
generating a financial crisis or other destabilization
phenomena), crash algorithms that may exploit
financial instability for profit, as well as the
algorithmic response of the regulators to the crisis
(by stop/pause algorithms). Due to the intrinsic
complexity and the multiple entities involved in these
cases, no single entity (human or algorithm) can
monitor all financial interactions taking place at any
given point in time; this realizes the necessary
conditions for a system that maintains and sustains
itself via the function of automation: the system of
technology.

5. Discussion: from Artifact to System
Despite our use of the Flash Crash incident, we
are not making a value judgment whether algorithmic
trading is good or a bad. Indeed, there are scholars
arguing that – overall – high-frequency trading by
algorithms may even be beneficial for market
liquidity [2, 11, 19]. However, we would like to draw
the attention of our readers to the fundamental
imbalance in human/computer decision-making and
highlight the interest that this poses for the field of
IS. At a minimum, the conditions described above
should allow us to reflect further on the transition
from IT as an artifact (a tool shaped and used by
humans to serve human ends) to IT as its own system
(which in turn regards humans as tools for it to shape
and use to suit the IT system’s own ends). In that
condition, technology expresses itself through
emergent phenomena and cannot be controlled in a
causal way. Of course, this runs contrary to the
design of technologies with a specified coded
rationality.
The logic with which any given technological
artifact interacts with other technological artifacts
also requires reconsideration. In circumstances like
those we have described in the previous section for
the flash crash, one cannot deny that there is a high
degree of complexity (not even a prolonged
investigation could identify the “causes” as these are
distributed and not linked to single entities). But there
is another reading of complexity that could illuminate
an additional aspect. Luhmann defines complexity
“as a measure of the incapacity of a system to relate
each element to every other one, be it in the system
itself (system complexity) or in its environment
(environmental complexity). … Complexity means
the necessity of selective relations and, since
relations specify what elements are possible within
the system, complexity also means contingent
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elements. The analysis of complexity leads back to
the notion of self-referential, self-organizing
systems” [24, p.993]. Applied to the conditions that
this view of complexity poses for technological
interconnections, we can infer the following: different
technological artifacts must succumb to a restriction
of their individual coded rationalities as a
precondition to interconnect. A very simple example
of this is the following (this does not however capture
the technologized complexity of more complex
networks or entire function systems of society like
the economic system): Suppose we have two different
companies (A and B) that engage in algorithmic
trading and both companies are the only two
companies that want to sell/buy stock to/from another
company X. We assume that A will not know what
B’s strategy would be and vice versa. By
participating in algorithmic trading, A wants to sell
the stock of company X and has set an algorithmic
parameter between $20 and $10 (we’re making the
hypothesis here that price is the only criterion).
Company B on the other hand has set an algorithmic
parameter to buy the stock between $6 and $12. Both
algorithms are executed so that their strategies are
optimized (so the algorithm would first start
exploring the sale of the stock at $20 before going
down to $19.5, $19, and so on – one can inject here
several other conditions like the time-frequency with
which the drop would take place, the value of the
drop in each step (say $0.10, $0.50, $1), etc).
Similarly for B (starting from $6). But before even
this process starts to take place for A and B, the
subset of pre-coded rationalities, specifically the
subset within the range between $12-$20 for A and
$6-$10 for B, constitutes a non-existent set for an
observer who would have visibility of both. The
establishment of allowed relations between A and B
as a prerequisite for inter-connecting, necessitates a
restriction from the full spectrum of available
possibilities for each one. Even in this simple
example, seemingly well-defined thresholds that
express pre-coded rationalities are facing restrictions
based on their environment. The extent of
unavoidable restrictions in element-interconnection
cannot be anticipated by the designers of the original
systems of A and B. Despite the strict controls that
may be imposed by designers, an ensemble of
artifacts can evolve additional systemic conditions.
Then, if we consider more realistic assumptions
like: a) dynamic ranges in price (say between $x and
$y), which will not be fixed, or b) algorithms that
take input from their (uncertain and dynamic)
environments in order to “determine” that (temporary
$x-$y) range, we can see how millions of transactions
and
millisecond-timeframes
fuel
systemic

complexity. What is the role of designers in this
case? What meaning does “controllability” acquire in
the context of an “artifact?” Hence, the design of any
technological artifact (such as an algorithm) with a
specific coded rationality is simply the starting point
through which that artifact will be allowed to partake
in the complex nexus of algorithmic exchanges.
Through those, all technologized trading algorithms
“design” the market collectively and create an
asymmetry between humans/technology; in those
domains where technology has become more
dominant in overtaking human decision-making, this
implies a severe restriction of human agency,
intentionality, participation, and decision-making.
This shift that we describe does not only imply
that “technologies create the ways in which people
perceive reality” [35, p.21]. In taking decision
making away from humans, technologized decision
making within the context of a system of technology
creates a reality that casts humans out to its
environment. Alas, human decision-making is
becoming more and more restricted in a
support/“tool-like” role that allows for the
continuation of complex and invisible (at the level of
the system) technologized decision-making. In
mutating from an artifact to a system, technology
carves new boundaries in the distinction between
humans and technology. This presents new
challenges and opens up an important and novel
domain for IS research, the consequences of which
must be investigated further.
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